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Abstract
The standard route for aggregating inﬁnite utility streams using a
real-valued representation runs into well-known diﬃculties as soon as
we insist on the axiom of inter-generational equity. The aim of this
paper is to explore what is feasible without abandoning this axiom.
The paper focusses its attention on the Pareto axiom and domain
restrictions. It turns out that once we weaken these requirements, real-
valued aggregation becomes possible in a variety of ways (though, of
course, impossibility results lurk everywhere). By establishing a series
of results, this paper tries to chalk out the frontier between what is
possible and what is not.
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11 Introduction
The need to aggregate and evaluate inﬁnite streams of returns or utility arises
in several areas of economics, ranging from inter-generational welfare theory
to environmental economics. The subject of inter-generational equity in the
context of aggregating inﬁnite utility streams has been of enduring interest
to economists, starting with the work of Ramsey (1928), who had main-
tained that discounting one generation’s utility or income vis-a-vis another’s
to be “ethically indefensible”, and something that “arises merely from the
weakness of the imagination.” His conjecture about the diﬃculty of aggre-
gating inﬁnite streams, while respecting inter-generational equity, turned out
to be compelling, as a large number of impossibility theorems were proved
subsequently by a number of authors, starting with the seminal works of
Koopmans (1960) and Diamond (1965).
Yet, it would be wrong to abandon the eﬀort to search for a social wel-
fare function that aggregates inﬁnite streams of returns and satisﬁes inter-
generational anonymity and some form of the Pareto criterion. In reality,
we encounter this problem all the time. In deciding whether to build a dam
on a river, which will help irrigation and generate electricity but damage
fauna and ﬂora, we clearly face a problem of choosing between long streams
of utility, stretching far into the future. Even if we believe that the world
has a ﬁnite future, since we do not know its termination date, we eﬀectively
face an inﬁnite decision problem.
Moreover, every time we analyze an inﬁnitely repeated game, we are
forced to confront an inﬁnite decision problem. And, if we are to pass judge-
m e n to nw h i c ha m o n gas e to fp o s s i b l eo u t comes is superior, we are compelled
to contend with precisely the problem that is the concern of this paper.
In Diamond’s celebrated paper (1965) he had shown that there is no social
welfare function that aggregates inﬁnite utility streams while satisfying the
Pareto condition, a weak form of anonymity and a continuity property1.I n
a recent paper (Basu and Mitra, 2003), we tried to show that the problem is
more discouraging because the impossibility result survives even if we do not
impose any continuity restriction on the social welfare function. Are we then
completely into a cul de sac? This paper tries to answer this in the negative.
We can think of many routes to getting possibililty results. In an elegant
1The continuity property postulated by Diamond is with respect to the sup metric on
X =[ 0 ,1]N.
2paper, Svensson (1980) had shown that if, instead of seeking a (real-valued)
social welfare function, we merely searched for the ability to rank inﬁnite
streams of utilities, then it is possible to prove that the requirements of equity
and the Pareto principle are compatible. He does this, however, with the
use of Szpilrajn’s theorem, which implies a non-constructive proof. Related
results have been obtained by Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003) and Bossert,
Sprumont and Suzumura (2004).
Though we delve brieﬂy into this, our main aim in this paper is to look
for possibility theorems that satisfy representability; that is, the existence of
real-valued social welfare functions. More precisely our aim is to delineate
the frontier of possibility and impossibility results for the existence of real-
valued social welfare functions. We consider, in particular, weakening the
Pareto axiom and exploring domain restrictions.
It does seem that in reality the domain of values that individual utilities
can take is often quite limited. The simple assumption that an individual’s
utility can be represented by any real number may be mathematically con-
venient but is unrealistic. Given the limits of human perception, it is much
more realistic to suppose that individual utilities can take a ﬁnite number of
values or, at most, a countably inﬁnite number of values. Thus, exploring
the implications of such domain restrictions certainly seems worthwhile.
Of course, domain restrictions by themselves will not yield possibility
theorems, given the general impossibility theorem of Basu and Mitra (2003,
Theorem 1), which applies to all domains, however restrictive they may be.2
But, we will try to show that, as soon as we combine domain restrictions with
weaker versions of the Pareto axiom, the scope for the use of social welfare
functions expands considerably (Theorem 3).
Our investigation also reveals that the particular nature of the domain
restriction may be quite important for such possibility results. Under domain
restrictions of other types, even the Weak Pareto axiom is seen to be incom-
patible with the requirement of an equitable social welfare function (Theorem
4). However, if the postulated version of Pareto is suﬃciently weak, then it is
possible to generate equitable and Paretian social welfare functions without
any domain restrictions (Theorem 5).
It is true that the exercise that we undertake in this paper is abstract and
2Of course, the case in which the period utility space is a singleton, and so the domain
of the social welfare function is also a singleton, is ruled out in the framework of Basu and
Mitra (2003, Theorem 1).
3theoretical but it is motivated by the practical concern for shedding light on
what is feasible once we reject the standard (inequitable) method of aggre-
gating streams by discounting the returns that accrue to future generations.
2 Formal Setting and Basic Results
Let R be the set of real numbers, N the set of positive integers, and M the
set of non-negative integers. Suppose Y ⊂ R is the set of all possible utilities
that any generation can achieve. Then X = Y N is the set of all possible
utility streams. If {xt}∈X,t h e n{xt} =( x1,x 2,...), where, for all t ∈ N,
xt ∈ Y represents the amount of utility that the generation of period t earns.
For all y,z ∈ X,w ew r i t ey ≥ z if yi ≥ zi, for all i ∈ N; we write y>zif
y ≥ z and y  = z;a n dw ew r i t ey> >z ,i fyi >z i,f o ra l li∈ N.
If Y has only one element, then X is a singleton, and the problem of
ranking or evaluating inﬁnite utility streams is trivial. Thus, without further
mention, the set Y will always be assumed to have at least two distinct
elements.
A social welfare function (SWF) is a mapping W : X → R. Consider now
t h ea x i o m st h a tw em a yw a n tt h eS W Ft os a t i s f y . T h eﬁ r s ta x i o mi st h e
standard Pareto condition.
Pareto Axiom: For all x,y ∈ X,i fx>y ,t h e nW(x) >W(y).
The next axiom is the one that captures the notion of ‘inter-generational
equity’. We shall call it the ‘anonymity axiom’.3 It is equivalent to the
notion of ‘ﬁnite equitableness’ (Svensson, 1980) or ‘ﬁnite anonymity’ (Basu,
1994).4
Anonymity Axiom: For all x,y ∈ X,i ft h e r ee x i s ti,j ∈ N such
that xi = yj and xj = yi, and for every k ∈ N −{ i,j}, xk = yk,t h e n
W(x)=W(y).
We shall begin by stating the main impossibility theorem that was es-
tablished in Basu and Mitra (2003, Theorem 1). This will be the setting in
which we can then ask the question of what is possible.
3In informal discussions throughout the paper, the terms “equity” and “anonymity”
are used interchangeably.
4The Anonymity Axiom ﬁgures prominently in the social choice theory literature, where
it is stated as follows: the social ordering is invariant to the information regarding individ-
ual orderings as to who holds which preference ordering. Thus, interchanging individual
preference proﬁles does not change the social preference proﬁle. For discussions of this
axiom and its acceptability see May (1952) and Sen (1970, 1977).
4Theorem 1 There does not exist any SWF satisfying the Pareto and Anonymity
Axioms.
It is the rather sparse requirement of this theorem that is at the root of
the frustration that this ﬁeld of inquiry has generated. Note, in particular,
that the impossibility result does not depend on any continuity postulate on
t h eS W F ;a n d ,i ta p p l i e st oa l ld o m a i n so ft h eS W F .
Before exploring the routes out of this, it is useful to place the problem
in perspective by recalling Svensson’s (1980) important theorem. Let us
suppose that we abandon the search for an SWF and instead look for a social
welfare ordering5 (SWO). We then have the result due to Svensson (1980)
that there is an SWO which satisﬁes the (appropriate relational versions of
the) Pareto and Anonymity axioms. For reasons of completeness we brieﬂy
review Svensson’s result. We do this also because, the use of a variant of
Szpilrajn’s Theorem (due to Suzumura, 1983, Theorem A(5)) allows us to
give a particularly easy proof of it. Furthermore, Svensson (1980) restricts
his exercise to the case where Y is the closed interval [0,1]; we state the
version of his result which applies to any utility space Y. His proof, as well
as ours, applies to this more general setting.
Formally, an SWO is a binary relation, ,o nX,w h i c hi sc o m p l e t ea n d
transitive. We use   and ∼ to denote, respectively, the asymmetric and
symmetric parts of . The properties of Pareto and Anonymity for an SWO
are easy to deﬁne. We shall call these axioms -Pareto and -Anonymity
to distinguish them from the axioms applied to an SWF.
-Pareto Axiom: For all x, y ∈ X, x>yimplies x   y.
-Anonymity Axiom: For all x,y ∈ X,i ft h e r ee x i s ti,j ∈ N,s u c h
that xi = yj and xj = yi and for every k ∈ N −{ i,j}, xk = yk,t h e nx ∼ y.
First, let us give a statement of Suzumura’s result. Let Ω be a set of
alternatives. If R i sab i n a r yr e l a t i o no nΩ and R∗ an ordering on Ω,w e
shall say that R∗ is an ordering extension of R if, for all x,y ∈ Ω,xR y
implies xR ∗ y.W e s a y t h a t R is consistent if, for all t ∈ N,a n df o ra l l
x1, x2,...,x t ∈ Ω, [x1Rx 2 and not x2Rx1, and for all k ∈{ 2,3,...,t− 1},
xkRxk+1] implies not xtRx1.
Lemma 1 (Szpilrajn’s Corollary [Suzumura, 1983]) :A b i n a r y r e l a -
tion R on Ω has an ordering extension if and only if it is consistent.
5An ordering is a binary relation which is complete and transitive.
5Before proving the next theorem it is useful to introduce some new no-
tation. If σ : N → N is a permutation and there exists t ∈ N such that for
all k>t ,σ (k)=k, then we shall call σ a ﬁnite permutation. G i v e naﬁ n i t e
permutation, σ, we shall use n(σ) to denote the smallest integer t which has
the property that, for all k>t ,σ (k)=k.
Given a ﬁnite permutation, σ, and x ∈ X,w es h a l lu s ex(σ) to denote
y ∈ X, where y is obtained by permuting the elements of x using σ.
In contrast to Theorem 1, we now have:
Theorem 2 (Svensson, 1980) : There exists a social welfare ordering sat-
isfying the -Pareto and -Anonymity Axioms.
Proof. Deﬁne two binary relations, P and I,o nX, as follows. For all
x,y ∈ X,i fx>ythen xPy. And if there exists i,j such that xi = yj
and xj = yi, and xk = yk for all k  = i,j,t h e nxIy. Now deﬁne the binary
relation R as follows: xRy ⇐⇒ xPy or xIy.
To see that R is consistent, suppose t ∈ N and x1,x 2,...,xt ∈ X such that
(A) x1Rx2 and not x2Rx1, and
(B) xkRxk+1, for all k ∈{ 2,3,...t − 1}.
We have to show that not xtRx1.
Note that (A) and (B) can be written equivalently as
(A’) x1Px 2, and
(B’) xkPxk+1 or xkIxk+1, for all k ∈{ 2,3,...t− 1}.
Note that (A’) and [x2Px 3 or x2Ix3]i m p l yt h a tt h e r ee x i s t saﬁ n i t ep e r -
mutation, σ3, such that:
(A”) x1Px3(σ3).
Next note that (A”) and [x3Px 4 or x3Ix4] imply that there exists a ﬁnite
permutation, σ4, such that:
x1Px 4(σ4).
Continuing in the same way we get the result that there exists a ﬁnite
permutation, σt, such that:
x1Px t(σt).
This implies not [xtPx 1 or xtIx1]. Therefore, not xtRx1.
Hence, by Szpilrajn’s Corollary, R has an ordering extension . Clearly
 satisﬁes the -Pareto Axiom and the -Anonymity Axiom.
For a long time, researchers have conjectured that the impossibility of
having a social welfare function satisfying Pareto and anonymity was a prob-
lem of representability; that is, of there not being “enough real numbers”
6to do the job. Since Diamond’s theorem (1965) showed that the require-
ments of Pareto, anonymity and continuity were inconsistent, the conjecture
remained an open one. But in the light of Theorem 1 above we can state
a corollary which (a) conﬁrms the conjecture, and (b) clariﬁes the relation
between Theorems 1 and 2 in a way that is especially useful. Toward this
end, deﬁne:
Representability: AS W O ,,i srepresentable if there exists a mapping,
f : X → R, such that, for all x,y ∈ X, x  y ⇐⇒ f(x) ≥ f(y).
In the light of Svensson’s result, Theorem 1 can be restated as follows.
Corollary 1 There does not exist a SWO satisfying the -Pareto Axiom,
the -Anonymity Axiom and representability.
Proof. If a representable SWO satisﬁes the -Pareto Axiom and the
-Anonymity Axiom, the real-valued function, f : X → R, that represents
the SWO, must satisfy the Pareto and Anonymity Axioms. But we know
from Theorem 1 that no such f exists. This establishes the result.
This result makes the nature of the impossibility clear. If we are looking
for an equitable SWO (that is, one satisfying the anonymity principle) to
evaluate inﬁnite streams of returns, we have to be prepared to weaken the
Pareto axiom or to give up the representability requirement. There is a case
for exploring both these avenues. In a recent paper Bossert, Sprumont and
Suzumura (2004) have looked at the possibilities that emerge when one does
not require representability.6 In what follows, we explore what is possible by
relaxing the Pareto axiom.
3 Weakening Pareto
It is arguable that for certain philosophical and even policy purposes we do
not need the full power of the Pareto condition (even if we are committed
Paretians) simply because all the possibilities that are technically allowed in
our speciﬁcation of the domain may not arise under any eventuality. Indeed
for certain ethical discourses involving the comparison of the moral worth
of individual actions and universalizable rules (see Basu, 1994) it may be
enough to be armed with some weaker forms of Paretianism.
6In this connection, see also the papers by Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003), and Xu
(2005).
7One idea that may be of interest is to restrict the analysis to cases where
one state is obtained from another through changes in a ﬁnite number of
periods. For such cases it is enough to use the following weakening of Pareto
that we shall call “weak dominance.”
Weak Dominance Axiom: For all x,y ∈ X,i ff o rs o m ej ∈ N,
xj >y j,w h i l e ,f o ra l lk  = j, xk = yk,t h e nW(x) >W(y).
Another version of Pareto—this one has been widely used in the literature
(see Arrow, 1963; Sen, 1977)—is the “Weak Pareto” axiom, as deﬁned below.7
Weak Pareto Axiom: For all x, y ∈ X,i fx> >y ,then W(x) >W(y).
A natural next step is to consider an axiom that combines the two above
axioms. That is precisely what the next axiom does.
Partial Pareto Axiom: The SWF, W, satisﬁes the Weak Dominance
axiom and the Weak Pareto Axiom.
The Partial Pareto Axiom demands that the SWF be positively sensitive
to an increase in utility of a single generation, the utilities of other generations
being unchanged (and therefore that it be positively sensitive to increases in
utilities of any ﬁnite number of generations, the utilities of other generations
being unchanged ), and also that the SWF be positively sensitive to an
increase in utilities of all generations. However, it need not be positively
sensitive to an increase in utilities of an inﬁnite number of generations, when
the utilities of a (non-empty) set of generations is unchanged. This is the
principal diﬀerence between the Partial Pareto axiom and the Pareto axiom.
3.1 Possibility Results for Restricted Domains
Note that if we recognize that human perception or cognition is not endlessly
ﬁne, so that suﬃciently small changes in well-being go unperceived, it seems
reasonable to suppose that the set of feasible utilities will be a discrete set.8
The same is true if the beneﬁts are measured in money and there is a well-
deﬁned smallest unit, as is true for all currencies (Segerberg, 1976). Thus, it
seems worthwhile to explore whether, with Y ⊂ M (which captures this very
reasonable possibility), there is a social welfare function (on X) respecting
7In fact, in some of the literature, what we are calling “Weak Pareto” is often called
“Pareto”, with the suﬃx “strong” added to what we have called simply the “Pareto axiom”.
8The idea of setting a limit to the ﬁneness of human perception has been used in a
diﬀerent context by Armstrong(1939) to argue that it is unreasonable to suppose that
indiﬀerence is a transitive relation. For a discussion of this issue in individual choice
theory, see Majumdar (1962).
8Anonymity and one of the weaker versions of the Pareto axiom, introduced
above.9 It is interesting to note that the domain restriction allows us to
establish the existence of an equitable SWF, which satisﬁes the strongest of
these versions of Pareto, namely the Partial Pareto axiom.
Proposition 1 Assume Y ⊂ M . There exists an SWF satisfying the
Partial Pareto and Anonymity Axioms.
Proof. For each x ∈ X,l e tE(x)={y ∈ X : there is some N ∈ N,
such that yk = xk for all k ∈ N,w h i c ha r e≥ N}.L e t   be the collection
{E : E = E(x) for some x ∈ X}. Then   is a partition of X.T h a t i s , i f
E and F belong to  , then either E = F,o rE is disjoint from F; further,
∪E∈ E = X.
Deﬁne a function, f : X → M as follows. Given any x ∈ X,l e tf(x)=
min{x1,x 2,...}.S i n c e xi ∈ M for all i ∈ N,t h es e t{x1,x 2,...} is a non-
empty subset of the set of non-negative integers and therefore has a smallest
element [Munkres, 1975, p. 32]. Thus, f is well-deﬁned.
By the axiom of choice, there is a function, g :  →X, such that g(E) ∈
E for each E ∈  .
Given any x ∈ X, we can denote for each N ≥ 1, (x1,...,xN) by x(N),
and (x1 + ... + xN) by I(x(N)).N e x t , g i v e n a n y x,y in E ∈  ,d e ﬁ n e
h(x,y) = limN→∞[I(x(N)) − I(y(N))].N o t i c e t h a t h is well-deﬁned, since
given any x,y in E ∈  ,t h e r ei ss o m eM ∈ N, such that [ I(x(N)) −
I(y(N))] is a constant for all N ≥ M.N o w , g i v e n a n y x,y in E ∈  ,d e ﬁ n e
H(x,y)=0 .5[h(x,y)/[1 + |h(x,y)|]].T h e n H(x,y) ∈ (−0.5,0.5).
We now deﬁne W : X → R as follows. Given any x ∈ X,w ea s -
sociate with it its equivalence class, E(x). Then, using the function g,
we get g(E(x)) ∈ E(x). Next, using the functions, h and H,w eo b -
tain h(x,g(E(x))) and H(x,g(E(x))).F i n a l l y , d e ﬁ n e W(x)=f(x)+
H(x,g(E(x))).
The Anonymity Axiom can be veriﬁed as follows. If x,y are in X,a n d
there exist i,j in N,s u c ht h a txi = yj and xj = yi, while xk = yk for all
k ∈ N, such that k  = i,j,t h e nE(x)=E(y). Furthermore, denoting this
common set by E,w es e et h a th(x,g(E)) = h(y,g(E)),a n ds oH(x,g(E)) =
9While our choice of Y as a subset of the set of non-negative integers is motivated
by the imprecision of human perception, the mathematical technique used to obtain our
possibility result applies also to the case where Y = {(1/n):n ∈ N}, where clearly human
perception has to be considered to be suﬃciently reﬁned.
9H(y,g(E)). Further, the set {x1,x 2,...} i st h es a m ea st h es e t{y1,y 2,...},
so that f(x)=f(y).T h u s , w e o b t a i n : W(x)=W(y).
The Partial Pareto Axiom can be veriﬁed as follows. If x,y are in X,a n d
there exists i ∈ N, such that xi >y i, while xk = yk for all k ∈ N, such that
k  = i,t h e nE(x)=E(y). Furthermore, denoting the common set by E,
we see that h(x,g(E)) >h (y,g(E)).T h i s i m p l i e s H(x,g(E)) >H(y,g(E)).
Further, the smallest element of the set {x1,x 2,...} is at least as large as the
smallest element of the set {y1,y 2,...},s ot h a tw eh a v ef(x) ≥ f(y).T h u s ,
we obtain the desired inequality: W(x) >W(y).
If x,y ∈ X,a n dx> >y ,t h e nE(x)  = E(y). T h u s ,w ew i l ln o tb ea b l e
to compare H(x,g(E(X))) with H(y,g(E(y))). However, we do know that
H(x,g(E(x))) > −0.5,a n dH(y,g(E(y))) < 0.5. Further, since x> >y ,w e
have f(x) ≥ f(y)+1 .T h u s , w e o b t a i n :
W(x)=f(x)+H(x,g(E)) >f(y)+1− 0.5 >f(y)+H(y,g(E)) = W(y).
Proposition 1 has two shortcomings. First, it is a possibility result for
a social welfare function, but we do not know how to construct the social
welfare function whose existence is asserted, since our proof uses the Axiom
of Choice.10The possible policy use of Proposition 1 is therefore limited.
The second shortcoming can be seen by considering the set-up, where Y =
{0,1}, so that we have the strongest possible domain restriction. Theorem 1
implies that there is no SWF respecting the Pareto and Anonymity Axioms.
And, Proposition 1 implies that there is an SWF satisfying the Partial Pareto
and Anonymity Axioms. It follows that any social welfare function, W,s o
obtained, must violate the Pareto principle in a way that is particularly
disturbing; that is, it must be the case that there exist alternatives x,y ∈ X
such that x>y ,but W(x) <W(y).
To see this, suppose on the contrary that there is an SWF, W, satisfying
the Anonymity and Partial Pareto axioms, and the “monotonicity condition”:
For all x,y ∈ X, if x>y , then W(x) ≥ W(y) (M)
We claim then that W must, in fact, satisfy the Pareto Axiom. To see this,
let x,y ∈ X with x>y .There are three possibilities: (i) x> >y ,(ii) xi >y i
10The use of the Axiom of Choice in proving impossibility results is, perhaps, less ob-
jectionable.
10for i ∈ F, where F is a ﬁnite subset of N, and xi = yi for all i ∈ N ∼ F, (iii)
xi >y i for i ∈ I, where I is an inﬁnite strict subset of N, and xi = yi for all
i ∈ N ∼ I. In cases (i) and (ii), by the Partial Pareto axiom, we must have
W(x) >W(y). In case (iii), let j be the smallest index in I, and deﬁne z by
zj = yj and zi = xi for all i  = j. Then, z ∈ X, and z>y ,so that by (M),
W(z) ≥ W(y). Also, comparing x and z, we see that they diﬀer in only the
j −th index, and xj >y j = zj, so that the Partial Pareto axiom implies that
W(x) >W (z). Thus, W(x) >W (y), and our claim is established. But, by
Theorem 1, there is no SWF satisfying the Pareto and Anonymity axioms.
Consequently, any SWF, W, satisfying the Anonymity and Partial Pareto
axioms, must violate the “monotonicity condition” (M).11
Both the shortcomings of Proposition 1 arise from the fact that we are
trying to deﬁne a social welfare function, which is sensitive to the utility of a
single generation, when the utilities of all other generations are unchanged.
If we give up this sensitivity, and weaken our Partial Pareto requirement to
the Weak Pareto one, we get a particularly satisfying possibility result on all
domains X, when Y ⊂ M.
Theorem 3 Assume Y ⊂ M .T h e n t h e S W F , W : X → M, given by:
W(x)=m i n {x1,x 2,...} for all x ∈ X (MIN)
satisﬁes the Weak Pareto and Anonymity Axioms. Further, the SWF, deﬁned
by (MIN), satisﬁes the monotonicity condition (M).
Proof. The function, W : X → M, given by (MIN) is well-deﬁned (as
already noted in the proof of Proposition 1). If x,y ∈ X and x> >y ,then
denoting an index, for which min{x1,x 2,...} is attained, by k ∈ N, we have:
W(y)=m i n {y1,y 2,...}≤yk <x k =m i n {x1,x 2,...} = W(x)
so that the Weak Pareto axiom is satisﬁed.
If x,y ∈ X, and there exist i,j ∈ N, such that xi = yj and xj = yi,w h i l e
xk = yk for all k ∈ N, such that k  = i,j, then the set {x1,x 2,...} is the same
as the set {y1,y 2,...},s ot h a tW(x)=W(y). Thus, the Anonymity axiom is
satisﬁed.
11A weak version of Pareto, which requires that the “monotonicity condition” (M),
together with what we have called Weak Pareto axiom, be satisﬁed, is quite appealing,
and has been proposed and examined by Diamond (1965).
11Finally, if x,y ∈ X and x>y ,then denoting an index, for which
min{x1,x 2,...} is attained, by k ∈ N, we have:
W(y)=m i n {y1,y 2,...}≤yk ≤ xk =m i n {x1,x 2,...} = W(x)
so that the monotonicity condition (M) is satisﬁed.
The social welfare function in Theorem 3 can be explicitly written down
(as in (MIN)), and this makes the possibility result especially useful for policy
purposes.
3.2 Weakening Domain Restrictions
The above possibility results are obtained by weakening the Pareto axiom
(to Partial Pareto or to Weak Pareto)and also considering a discrete domain.
How would a change in the latter aﬀect the results? It is especially useful to
ask this question in the context where Y =[ 0 ,1], since this is the standard
framework used by Koopmans (1960), Diamond (1965), Svensson (1980) and
others.
As it turns out, we run again into impossibility results, which means that
with Y =[ 0 ,1], the weakening of Pareto to Partial Pareto or to Weak Pareto
does not help to reverse the impossibility result of Theorem 1. To establish
the ﬁrst of these impossibility results, which follows directly from the result
of Basu and Mitra (2003, Theorem 2), it is useful to introduce a new axiom,
the interest in which is purely constructive, so as to be able to explain the
next result clearly.
Dominance Axiom: For all x,y ∈ X, if there exists j ∈ N such that
xj >y j, and, for all k  = j, xk = yk,t h e nW(x) >W(y).F o r a l l x,y ∈ X,
if x> >y ,t h e nW(x) ≥ W(y).
Note that the last inequality in the statement of this axiom is a weak
inequality, unlike in the deﬁnition of the Partial Pareto Axiom. Hence,
Partial Pareto is stronger than Dominance (which in turn is stronger than
Weak Dominance).12
Proposition 2 Assume Y ⊃ [0,1]. There is no SWF satisfying the Partial
Pareto and Anonymity Axioms.
12It is also worth noting that between Dominance and Weak Pareto, neither is stronger
than the other. They are in fact non-comparable in terms of strength. The same is true
between Weak Dominance and Weak Pareto.
12Proof. By Theorem 2 of Basu and Mitra (2003), we know that there is no
SWF satisfying the Dominance and Anonymity axioms. The result is proved
by noting that the Partial Pareto axiom is stronger than the Dominance
axiom.
When we weaken the Partial Pareto axiom (of Proposition 2) to Weak
Pareto, the impossibility result persists, but it is a more subtle result, since
the sensitivity of the SWF to a change in a single generation’s utility (when
the utilities of all other generations are unchanged) is not being imposed.
The proof of it is, likewise, more intricate, combining the methods used by
Basu and Mitra (2003, Theorem 2) and by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003).
Theorem 4 Assume Y ⊃ [0,1]. There is no SWF satisfying the Weak Pareto
Axiom and the Anonymity Axiom.
Proof. To establish the theorem, assume that there exists a social welfare
function, W : X → R, which satisﬁes the Weak Pareto and Anonymity
Axioms.











































For s ∈ I ≡ (−0.5,0.5), deﬁne:
y(s)=0 .5y +0 .25(1 + s)e (3)
Then (1/8)e ≤ y(s) ≤ (7/8)e,a n ds oy(s) ∈ X for each s ∈ I.
Deﬁne the function, f : I → R by: f(s)=W(y(s)). By the Weak Pareto
Axiom, f is monotonic increasing in s on I. Thus f has only a countable
number of points of discontinuity in I. Let a ∈ I be a point of continuity
of the function f.
Deﬁne the sequence x(a) as follows:
x(a)=0 .5x +0 .25(1 + a)e (4)
Clearly, x(a) ∈ X and y(a) >> x(a). By the Weak Pareto Axiom, W(y(a)) >
W(x(a)). We denote [W(y(a)) − W(x(a))] by θ; then θ>0.
13Denote max(0.5−a, 0.5+a) by  ; then,   > 0. Since f is continuous at a,
given the θ deﬁned above, there exists δ ∈ (0, ), such that: 0 < |s − a| <δ
implies |f(s) − f(a)| <θ .Note that for 0 < |s − a| <δ ,we always have
s ∈ I.
For p ∈ N, let r(p) denote the ﬁrst non-zero remainder of the successive
divisions of p by 4, and q(p) the number of divisions with a zero remainder.
[For example, r(52) = 1 and q(52) = 1].
Deﬁne (following Fleurbaey and Michel (2003, page 796)), for each k ∈ N,















































where p runs from 1 to 4k − 1, and the term [4p/(4k+1)] is repeated q(4p)
times if r(4p)=1 , and q(4p)+1times otherwise. Now, for each k ∈ N,w e
use xk to deﬁne xk(a) as follows:
x
k(a)=0 .5x
k +0 .25(1 + a)e (6)
Clearly, xk(a) ∈ X for each k ∈ N. Comparing the expressions for x(a) and
x1(a) in (4) and (6) respectively, we see that x1(a) is obtained from x(a) by
a ﬁnite permutation, and that for all k>1,x k(a) is obtained from xk−1(a)
by a ﬁnite permutation. Thus, for every k ∈ N,x k(a) is obtained from x(a)
by a ﬁnite permutation, and the Anonymity Axiom yields:
W(x
k(a)) = W(x(a)) for all k ∈ N (7)
Choose K ∈ N with K ≥ 2 such that (1/4K−2) <δ , and deﬁne S =
(a − (1/4K−2)).W e n o t e t h a t 0 < (a − S) <δ ,a n ds oS ∈ I, and:
W(y(S)) = f(S) >f(a) − θ = W(y(a)) − θ (8)




K +0 .25(1 + a)e =0 .5y +0 .25(1 + a)e − 0.5(y − x
K)
= y(a) − 0.5(y − x
K)
≥ y(a) − 0.5(1/4
K)e
=0 .5y +0 .25(1 + a)e − 0.5(1/4
K)e
> 0.5y +0 .25(1 + a − (1/4
K−1))e
=0 .5y +0 .25(1 + a − (1/4
K−2))e +0 .25(3/4
K−1)e
>> 0.5y +0 .25(1 + S)e = y(S)
Thus, by the Weak Pareto Axiom, we have:
W(x
K(a)) >W(y(S)) (9)
Using (7), (8) and (9), we obtain:




>W (y(a)) − θ
a contradiction, which establishes our result.
It is worth noting that, with the domain restriction Y ⊂ M, weakening the
Pareto axiom to the Weak Pareto axiom led to a reversal of the impossibility
result of Theorem 1 to the possibility result of Theorem 3. When Y =[ 0 ,1],
a similar weakening of the Pareto axiom (to the Weak Pareto axiom) does
not produce such a reversal.
This suggests that to recover possibility when Y =[ 0 ,1], we need to
go to a weaker form of Pareto. In fact, Weak Dominance is not weaker
than Weak Pareto, but we can establish the existence of an equitable SWF,
which satisﬁes Weak Dominance. In fact, this possibility result holds with
no domain restriction. Our proof employs the idea, already used in the proof
of Proposition 1, of partitioning X into sets such that the members of each
set diﬀer from each other in only a ﬁnite number of indices. The proof of the
possibility result then crucially hinges on (i) the use of the Axiom of Choice,
and (ii) the fact that Weak Dominance never requires one to compare the
welfare of members in two diﬀerent sets of the partition.
15Theorem 5 T h e r ee x i s t sa nS W Fs a t i s f y i n gt h eW e a kD o m i n a n c ea n d
Anonymity Axioms.
Proof. For each x ∈ X,l e tE(x)={y ∈ X : there is some N ∈ N ,
such that yk = xk for all k ∈ N,w h i c ha r e≥ N}.L e t   be the collection
{E : E = E(x) for some x ∈ X}. Then,   is a partition of X.B y t h e
axiom of choice, there is a function, g :  →X,s u c ht h a tg(E) ∈ E,f o r
each E ∈  .
Given any x,y in E ∈  ,d e ﬁ n eh(x,y) = limN→∞[I(x(N))−I(y(N))].We
now deﬁne W : X → R as follows. Given any x ∈ X, we associate with
it its equivalence class, E(x). Then, using g,w eg e tg(E(x)) ∈ E(x),a n d ,
using h,w eo b t a i nh(x,g(E(x))). Now, deﬁne W(x)=h(x,g(E(x))). The
Anonymity Axiom and the Weak Dominance Axioms are easily veriﬁed.
4 Concluding Remarks
We wanted to demarcate the boundary between what is possible and what is
not and the set of results established in this paper tries to do that vis-a-vis
variations of the Pareto Axiom and the domain restriction for utilities. In
setting out to write this paper we had wanted to display the positive side
of this ﬁeld, namely, the possibility theorems. We have done so. But now,
at paper’s end, we ﬁnd that in the process we have also highlighted the
robustness of the impossibility theorems of the literature. This is probably
a reminder that we have no option but to play the hand that we are dealt.
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